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Abstract: Over four decades, research and policy have created layers of understandings in the 
quest for “good” corporate governance. The corporate excesses of the 1970s sparked a 
search for market mechanisms and disclosure to empower shareholders. The UK-focused 
problems of the 1990s prompted board-centric, structural approaches, while the fall of Enron 
and many other companies in the early 2000s heightened emphasis on director independence 
and professionalism. With the financial crisis of 2007-09, however, came a turn in some 
policy approaches and in academic literature seeking a different way forward. This paper 
explores those four phases and the discourse each develops and then links each to 
assumptions about accountability and cognition. After the financial crisis came pointers n 
policy and practice away from narrow, rationalist prescriptions and toward what the 
philosopher Stephen Toulmin calls “reasonableness”. Acknowledging that heightens 
awareness of complexity and interdependence in corporate governance practice. The paper 
then articulates a research agenda concerning what “reasonable” corporate governance might 
entail.  
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Introduction  
Four decades have passed since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
established the field we know as corporate governance. A quarter of a century has passed 
since Cadbury (1992) published the report and code that became the benchmark for the field, 
in Britain and many countries around the world. The explosion of research and policymaking 
that took developed during that period has provided a wealth of insights about boards of 
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directors, institutional investors, and the roles that codes of conduct, corporate disclosure and 
transparency play in the functioning of equity capital markets and strategic leadership. 
Practice has changed, too. Boards arguably now work harder than ever before. Disclosure 
rules give investors more information on the inner workings of the companies in which they 
invest. And waves of changes to voting arrangements have left investors more able to 
intervene when and even before things go wrong. And yet …  
During those 40 years, and especially during the last 25, we have witnessed an 
intensification of the misdemeanors and malfeasance that initially prompted concern about 
the state of corporate governance. And despite intensive research and policy consultation 
processes, some scholars maintain “we still know very little about corporate governance” 
(Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011, p. 312).  
This paper attempts to give a new shape to that lack of understanding. It provides a 
framework for different themes in the literature that links to key, field-configuring events 
(Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Oliver & Montgomery, 2008) to the approaches to concerns that 
have arisen and evolved over those 40 years, to conceptualizations of cognition, and to the 
philosophical stances they imply. This analysis describes development from understandings 
rooted in rational-actor models associated with positivism and neo-classical economics, in 
the bounded rationality of in behavioral economics (Simon, 1978), or notions 
“reasonableness” (Toulmin, 2001, 2003), and the pragmatism to which they point. 
This framework helps, first, to categorize the literature and practices of corporate 
governance, drawing attention to the insights they offer and the blind spots they entail. 
Second, the evolution of theory and practice suggests a growing appreciation of the 
complexity of the field, which has confounded the search for solutions and which points to 
the need to approach further study from two different vantage points: a) empirically, the 
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need to contain complexity by focusing attention on narrower understandings of the 
problem; and b) normatively, to avoid easy prescriptions and encourage experimentation.  
This paper is structured as follows. We look first at the historical context, including both 
market-related developments and institutional arrangements that applied during four periods 
of time when crises provoked concern and even outrage over the failings of directors and the 
failures of corporations that had wide and growing significance for society at large. We turn 
then to scholarly studies and policy approaches that have developed as a result of these 
crises.  
This literature fits less than perfectly to the time periods in question, because ideas 
persist beyond the events that generated them and then influence future events. Nonetheless 
the themes in the literature link to the field-configuring events through sharing assumptions 
and developing a discourse about the nature of paths of accountability and the cognition of 
actors in the fields.  
That points us towards distinctions that lead us ontologically from the simple to the 
complex, normatively from the positive to the pragmatic, and epistemologically from the 
rational to what Toulmin (2001) calls reasonableness. The paper then provides a discussion 
of the implications for future research and policy direction that might lead us towards a 
concept of “reasonably” good corporate governance.  
Forty years of corporate governance 
Concerns about what we now call corporate governance have roots in the writings by 
Adam Smith (1759/1984, 1776/1904) and the 20th century elaboration by Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means (Berle, 1931; Berle & Means, 1932/1991). Both phases of attention arose 
from crises that endangered the system of production and society at large, though neither 
generated directly a field of study bringing together the complex interaction of corporations, 
investors, and more peripheral actors affected by the decisions they make.  
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That began to change, however, in the second half of the 20th century, as renewed 
prosperity after the Second World War created growing savings that fueled the birth of 
collective investments. It happened first in the United States and then elsewhere, in 
particular through pensions and mutual funds. The articulation of modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1952) and the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) gave theoretical 
justification for these new market structures. The development and then growth of these 
institutional investors ameliorated the distance that Berle and Means (1932/1991) identified 
between corporate managers and individual investors, opening avenues for power to shift 
from the former to the latter, leading ultimately to what came to be called a market for 
corporate control (Manne, 1965), later embodied in policy directions in many jurisdictions.  
Investor power in the early 1970s 
Following the go-go years of the 1960s (Brooks, 1973), the US economy gave way in 
the early 1970s to the supposed economic impossibility of stagflation, when high inflation 
accompanied a long period of slow growth. Following a radical rise in oil prices, corporate 
earnings stagnated and with them the Dow Jones Industrial Average and wider stock market 
measures. Growing power of investors and poor corporate performance led to renewed 
concern about the problem identified in Berle and Means (1932/1991), but this time in a 
market and institutional context better able to address it. Jensen and Meckling (1976) thus 
articulated in theory the agency problem, which led to new market structures, incentives, and 
institutional measures—including enhanced financial disclosure, tougher audit requirements, 
and shareholder rights—to align executive behavior with shareholder interests. 
With assumptions of a homo economicus (Rosenberg, 1979), the almost-mechanical self-
servingly rational social actor, agency theory looked for mechanisms of corporate 
governance that might prevent self-interest from becoming uncontrolled. Among those 
mechanisms: Stock options provided an incentive that could direct the interests of directors 
Nordberg  ‘Reasonably’ good corporate governance 
Philosophy of Management conference, St. Louis  Page 5 
 
toward shareholder needs. Stronger voting rights gave shareholders the power to enforce 
those mechanisms.  Moreover, transparency—through cash flow statements and more 
granular profit and loss accounts, product and geographic reports, and clarity about 
categories of assets and liabilities—reduced the information asymmetries that privileged 
insiders and impeded shareholders from using their power.  
Malfeasance in the early 1990s 
In scholarship as well as in practice, the phenomenon of reckless, self-interested 
corporate executives was seen as largely a US-centric issue. But the early 1990s brought a 
string a corporate collapses in Britain, including Colorall, Polly Peck, the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, and two large listed companies controlled by Robert Maxwell. 
Together with memories of less dramatic problems including those in the 1980s at IBH 
Holding and Schroeder Münchmeyer Hengst in West Germany, and the 1977 Chiasso affair 
at Credit Suisse in Switzerland, corporate governance problems no longer seemed confined 
to US practice.  
Institutional change came in the form of the Cadbury Report and Code (1992) in the UK 
and parallel developments in many countries around the world, notably including France, 
Belgium, South Africa, and Australia, and new legislation on company law in Germany. 
These reforms sought many structural changes to boards of directors. In a recommendation 
widely copied elsewhere, Cadbury urged the separation of the roles of chairman and chief 
executive so that no one individual would have “unfettered power” in the boardroom. Others 
included new board committees to consider audit, nominations, and executive pay, and an 
emphasis on outside, non-executive directors, with the goal of heading off future crises by 
nipping excess in the bud. These largely structural changes limited the power of the chief 
executive with the aim of reducing agency problems (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). The 
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emphasis on non-executives also highlighted concern about the independence of boards, a 
concern that would loom particularly large in seeking remedies that followed the next crisis.  
The dot-com bubble, Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, and …  
The problems in the real economy proved too great for either the US solutions—with 
their focus on shareholder value and stock options to align the interests of managers with 
shareholders—or those elsewhere, with new powers given to boards and the non-executive 
directors. Using options to keep managers attuned to shareholder interests had perverse 
effects (Economist, 2004; Matsumura & Jae Yong, 2005). Reform to board structures did not 
halt willful executives.  
In early 2000, scores of companies associated with the new economy of the internet 
collapsed, leading in some countries to the collapse of stock markets devoted to their new 
industrial revolution (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2008; Sell, 2006).  
Enron, an old-economy, oil-and-gas company, had moved into derivatives trading, 
became one of the world’s most admired firms, and then failed spectacularly. Encouraged by 
its auditors, Arthur Andersen, it had made liberal use of illegal, off-balance-sheet accounting 
devices to inflate its market value, as well as stock options rewarding share-price 
performance to enrich its managers (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2004; Nordberg, 2008).  
Other companies associated with Andersen soon unraveled as well. They included the 
telecommunications giant WorldCom, which suddenly arose from nowhere through the use 
of the market for corporate control and the powers given to corporate raiders under the 
mechanisms invented in the 1970s to “solve” the agency problem.  
But this was not entirely a US phenomenon. Ahold of the Netherlands, Parmalat in Italy, 
and HIH Holdings in Australia all collapsed under allegations of false accounting or fraud. 
The policy response was new legislation – e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Library of Congress, 
2002)  in the US – and new codes of conduct like those of the German Cromme Commission 
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(2002/2007) and the Higgs Review (2003) in the UK. In the US, Nasdaq and the New York 
Stock Exchange adopted listing rules that echoed some of the provisions of Cadbury 
(Nordberg, 2011).  
As well as retaining much of the institutional arrangements of prior generations of 
corporate governance measures, these initiatives placed even greater emphasis on the 
independence and professionalism of the non-executive directors. They also concentrated 
more structural power in the board committees they controlled. Surely, this would prevent a 
recurrence of the problems of agency and managerial excess. 
The financial crisis, 2007-09 
The early indications of the next crisis came in August 2007, when liquidity problems 
caused the near collapse of two German banks that invested heavily in mortgage-backed 
securities and derivatives issued by US banks. Shortly thereafter, Northern Rock in the UK 
imploded, from largely home-grown causes. Early in 2008 the US investment bank Bear 
Stearns had to be rescued. Then, in September, Lehman Brothers wasn’t rescued, setting off 
a chain reaction that brought the global banking industry and much of the insurance system 
perilously close to the brink. 
The policy response was immediate but with some unexpected twists. In the US, the 
Dodd-Frank Act (Library of Congress, 2010) heightened disclosure and investor scrutiny and 
gave further powers to large shareholders in the form of the ability to nominate directors and 
challenge management. From many other parts of the world came a policy drive for investor 
stewardship, that is, an emphasis on active ownership, focused on the long term success of 
the companies in which they invest. These included a Stewardship Code in the UK (FRC, 
2010b), similar initiatives in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and elsewhere, and a revision to 
company law across the European Union (2016). This new emphasis suggested growing 
conviction that the “solution” to corporate governance problems might lie with shifting 
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investor focus (Chiu, 2012) and market structures (e.g. Kay, 2012) to enhance long-term 
considerations, even as other voices were skeptical such measure would have the desired 
effects (Cheffins, 2010; Reisberg, 2015).  
Scholarly studies and policy directions 
These four episodes, growing in intensity and social impact, point to failings in policy, 
to deficits in scholarly attention to the evaluation of the antecedents of corporate governance 
problems, and to perhaps to a lack of attention to nature of them. Ahrens et al. (2011, p. 312) 
provide a critique of research that has failed to establish, for example, “specific ownership, 
board or incentive structures lead to better economic performance” or “conditions—e.g., 
firm size, industry, age—under which they generally lead to better results”.  
Economic performance modeling failed to anticipate the risks. Research on executive 
pay provided normative recommendations that exacerbated the problem. Research and 
policy pushed for greater board independence and professionalism, often at the cost of 
industry expertise and market knowledge.  
Ahrens et al. (2011) go on to recommend refocusing research in several different 
directions: a) new measures of corporate performance, b) understanding the impact of large 
events, c) economic competence of key actors on boards and among investors, d) how 
governance is practiced, e) differing national contexts and institutional systems, and f) 
attention to the multiplicity of problematic agency relationships in the investment supply 
chain, not just in the shareholder-manager dyad. These approaches, however, concern largely 
operational issues in corporate governance rather than the underlying conceptual and 
philosophical premises upon which they rest. 
Reading the literature against the timeline of critical incidents suggests another avenue 
of approach, which the balance of this paper seeks to articulate. It is one that examines the 
assumptions behind the key analyses and policy directions that sought to explain the crises in 
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corporate governance. These assumptions arise across two dimensions, accountability and 
cognition, and are underpinned by philosophical stances that determine both their value and 
their shortcomings (see Table 1). We start with a discussion of the discourse that arose 
during and developed after each of these four periods of crisis. 
------------------ Place Table 1 about here ------------------ 
Discourses of governance and their assumptions 
The groundbreaking analysis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) led to voluminous 
scholarly and commercial research to identify correlations between various variables of 
“good” governance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Boyd, 1995; Carpenter & Golden, 1997; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Fama, 1980; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 
1987). Indeed, the language of the scholarship and policy discussion alike invoked market 
mechanisms, prices, incentives, and other aspects that evoke neo-classical economics and 
suggests a mentality of governance1 stepped in shareholder value maximization and the 
emerging measurements of total shareholder return (Rappaport, 1981, 1986).  
But the picture that emerged from empirical studies was nuanced. For example, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found that board composition moderated the effect of stock 
options on corporate performance. It suggested a less-than-automatic link between equity 
incentives and outcomes, thereby questioning the degree to which stock options can align 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests. Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) 
conducted a meta-analysis of executive pay and corporate performance that found the only 
5% of the variation in pay in US companies was tied to performance.  
In the crisis in the UK in early 1990s, the problems entailed by this discourse of market 
mechanisms were becoming apparent. In their analysis of the language changes in the main 
version of the UK code, Nordberg and McNulty (2013) identify in Cadbury (1992) a strong 
emphasis on language concern structure: Good corporate governance, now seen as involving 
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specialized committees and the separation of power in the boardroom, provided a “buttress” 
against the agency problem. But again, empirical studies raised doubts about whether this 
was too simple an approach for a complex problem. For example, a meta-review by Dalton 
et al. (1998) found only weak support for a link between two mechanisms of corporate 
governance (board composition and leadership structure; both advocated in the Cadbury 
reforms) and firm performance. Still the discourse of shareholder value supported by a 
structural approach to achieve good governance has persisted in financial-economic studies, 
legal arguments, and accounting-led analyses of the field.  
By the time of the dot-com crisis and then Enron, skepticism about shareholder value 
was growing, however. Jensen (2001) had begun to invoke the concept of “enlightened value 
maximization,” which, while rooted in the discourse of shareholder value, also opened a 
channel toward an instrumental form of stakeholder orientation. It provided reasons, 
however tentative, to consider interests beyond those of investors (cf. Letza, Sun, & 
Kirkbride, 2004). 
The collapse of Enron brought a shift that created another layer in the discourse. That 
case (and the many others like it) illustrated the perverse effects of using options to align 
executive pay with investor interests. That case (and some others like it) raised questions 
whether board structure and the remedies it prescribed were adequate (Aguilera, Filatotchev, 
Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Arena & Braga-Alves, 2013). This time new remedies led to a 
new discourse concerned with the need for board independence (Nordberg & McNulty, 
2013), a professional state of mind that policy sought to embody through identifiable 
characteristics of directors. We see such a policy landscape in the US (Breeden, 2003) and 
the UK (Higgs, 2003), in outside, non-executive directors without commercial or personal 
ties to executives, and in having directors deemed independent control board processes 
concerning audit, nominations and pay.  
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There was in the literature already reason to be wary of expecting an easy solution from 
this version of a rationalist, positivist direction. Westphal (1998), for example, provided 
evidence that when facing greater board independence, CEOs engaged in higher levels of 
ingratiation and persuasion to neutralize the effects of the supposed stronger monitoring. The 
scholars who conducted qualitative research for the Higgs Review of the role of UK non-
executive directors (McNulty, Roberts, & Stiles, 2003), later raised doubts whether the 
mechanisms in Higgs (2003) would be adequate. They questioned whether understandings 
about monitoring and control based in agency theory or those about the service function of 
directors based in stewardship theory adequately reflected the complex lived experience of 
directors (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005).  
Scholarship in corporate governance then added another layer of concern, opening a 
stream of work called “behavioral governance” (Charreaux, 2005; Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004; Marnet, 2005; Pye, 2004; van Ees, van der Laan, & Postma, 2008). This literature 
studies the actions of directors and boards, cognizant of the limitation of a rationalist 
approach and drawing upon the concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) that informs 
behavioral economics.  
With the financial crisis on 2007-09 and the resulting economic malaise came another 
turn in policy prescriptions and the search for good governance. The renamed UK Corporate 
Governance Code (FRC, 2010a), drafted in the wake of the crisis, sought to develop a 
discourse about the need for strong relationships, within linked the boardroom and between 
boards and investors (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). The concurrent initiative of UK 
Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b) urged investors to become active owners, engaging in 
dialogue to develop mutual understanding (McNulty & Nordberg, 2016). This approach 
chimed with literature describing governance based on relationships rather than mechanisms 
(Fairbrass & Zueva-Owens, 2012; Goergen, Mallin, Mitleton-Kelly, Al-Hawamdeh, & Chiu, 
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2010), and echoing themes in family-led governance (Ko & Liu, 2016) and in other privately 
held firms (Uhlaner, Floren, & Geerlings, 2007).  
The four phases of corporate governance problems, policies, and discourse are not 
entirely discrete in time or substance. Mechanisms feature in all of them, and agency 
concerns have not disappeared even as evidence has mounted of the limitations in its 
explanations of the work of boards, directors, and investors. Talk of market mechanisms in 
the early literature was not replaced by structural concerns post-Cadbury or the discourse of 
board independence post-Enron. Indeed, examination of the version of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code as re-formulated after the financial crisis shows each discourse layered 
upon the next (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). 
These four, overlapping phases seem to be based on different understandings of 
accountability and different assumptions about director and investor cognition, which point 
toward different philosophical stances of what constitutes “good” governance. We turn next 
to accountability, then cognition, as they appear in policy and the literature (see Table 2).  
Accountability 
Accountability looms large in the corporate governance literature and practice, though 
with contested meanings. Mulgan (2000, p. 555) calls it an “ever-expanding” concept. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not use the term directly but they speak about the 
“accounting reports” as a means for shareholders and creditors to monitor managers. In 
Cadbury (1992), the section heading labeled “Accountability of Boards to Shareholders” 
makes clear its understanding of the direction and purpose of accountability. Accountability 
here is collective (the board) and upwards, to investors.  
Following the crises at Enron, WorldCom and others, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Library 
of Congress, 2002) required CEOs and CFOs personally to attest to the accuracy of financial 
statements. The Breeden Report (2003), however, emphasized the need for individual 
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accountability of the CEO to the board as a mechanism to restore investor trust in 
corporations. The increased emphasis on director independence and professionalism points 
toward executive accountability not just hierarchically to shareholders, but also 
hierarchically within the board.  
After the financial crisis, however, the new version of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (FRC, 2010a) discussed accountability only in rather general terms. It urged annual 
election of directors as a means of achieving accountability, but without directly mentioning 
shareholders in the section. Its title is simply “Accountability,” leaving “shareholders” out. 
In the code’s opening passages, accountability is a larger, less articulated concept, one of the 
principles of good governance. The accompanying UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b) uses 
the term only once, and in relation to the accountability of institutional investors to their 
beneficiaries.  
This shift in the tone of policy documents suggests a growing acceptance that 
accountability is a more complex concept, as academic discussion had begun to reflect. Even 
before Cadbury, Roberts (1991) wrote of accountability as a multi-dimensional concept, 
elaborating it as having vertical (“individualizing”) and horizontal (“socializing”) 
dimensions (see also Roberts, 2001). The former is impersonal and controlling, as the board 
monitors the CEO and shareholders the board. The latter, by contrast, is personal, face-to-
face, and supporting. He argues that in corporate governance both are needed.  
This view widens in the aftermath of Enron, in the suggestion that the lived experience 
of directors involves a complex dynamic between directors’ control and service functions 
(Roberts et al., 2005), rather than the two discrete ones often cited in the corporate 
governance literature. It chimes with the views in Butler (2005) of accountability as a 
relational concept, in and Painter-Morland (2006) as one in boardrooms and between boards 
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and other constituencies based not on mechanisms of control and sanction but instead on the 
human interaction of directors as moral agents.  
This view takes the concept of accountability far from the idea that corporate disclosure 
to enable shareholder activism in the narrow form of episodic, change-seeking behavior (for 
a discussion, see McNulty & Nordberg, 2016), and ultimately the market for corporate 
control. It also leads us to consider what cognitive assumptions underpin the four strands of 
thought in corporate governance practice and literature.  
------------------ Place Table 2 about here ------------------ 
Cognition 
The approach to corporate governance developed in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the 
policy, research, and practice they engendered assumes corporate managers and directors are 
self-interested, rational actors, weighing up costs and benefits to themselves, homo 
economicus (Rosenberg, 1979). Here the actor is the individual, not a collective agent. It was 
a perspective used to simplify economic models and one challenged from the outset and with 
new intensity following the financial crisis (Zafirovski, 2014). 
Rational choice coupled with notions of efficient markets, in which all relevant 
information is widely and freely available (Fama, 1970), pointed toward a mechanistic 
approach to corporate governance. What was needed were institutional changes enabling 
investors to overcome the information asymmetries that prevent markets efficiently. They 
could then judge the value of corporations and through incentives align managers’ self-
interest with shareholders’. But the success of such prescriptions rests of those twin 
assumptions, each of which was challenged in the subsequent crises and in the emerging 
empirical and normative literature of boards, corporations, and investors.  
Failures of the type that led to the Cadbury Code seemed to justify concern about the 
agency problem and its assumption of a rational, self-interested CEO. The remedies it 
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prescribed therefore involve an assumption of rational cognition but one based in a growing 
appreciation of the inefficiencies of markets.  
Exemplified in the frantic efforts by Robert Maxwell to keep his companies afloat in the 
late 1980s, the all-powerful CEO could still hoodwink investors owing to information 
asymmetries. But in the case of Maxwell in particular, the size of his personal shareholding 
meant his self-interest was aligned well with those of investors, at least on the basis of 
having a strong equity position. The heart of the problem lay with his deceptive and perhaps 
criminal use of the pension funds of workers to prop up the share price so as to sustain debt 
covenants, addressed in legislation, not the prescriptions of agency theory.  
This points toward a second-level of market failure that points up how the complexity of 
investment markets prevents efforts at enhancing transparency from making markets 
efficient. In response, the structural remedies in Cadbury enhanced the governance function 
of boards, relying less on markets and more on the possibility of challenge in business 
decision-making. Cadbury’s emphasis on separating the roles of chairman and CEO and 
emphasizing that of non-executives created an internal hierarchy that expands opportunities 
for what Forbes and Milliken (1999) call cognitive conflict within the boardroom. 
Board structures put in place after Cadbury looked less than sufficient when the next 
crisis hit, however. Now attention focused on the limitations of cognition, the inability of 
directors to see and process all the available information and the inability of investors to 
monitor the performance of the companies in which they invested. This bounded rationality 
recalls the premises of behavioral economics, the limitations of rational choice theory, and 
the need for a change in the expectations of what directors can do (Marnet, 2007).  
The discourse of independence that developed after Enron sought greater diversity of 
views in the boardroom and hence cognitive conflict to accompany the structures that 
facilitated such discussions. Independence and in particular control of key board functions 
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by independent directors provided not just internal monitoring but also the power to apply 
internal control.  
This layering of market mechanisms, structures, and independence became the norm of 
“good” corporate governance in the years that followed. When the financial crisis struck, one 
response was moves to add more control, more mechanisms and structures of hierarchical 
accountability, and seek more independence on corporate boards. But another response came 
in acceptance of the limitations of both cognition and hierarchies of accountability as 
controls over the complexities, the interconnectedness of the issues facings boards and 
investors.  
The preface to the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a) written in response to 
the crisis claimed the code was “not a rigid set of rules” and urged that “boards must think 
deeply, thoroughly and on a continuing basis” with “mutual respect and openness” (FRC, 
2010a, p. 2). “The Code has been enduring, but it is not immutable. Its fitness for purpose in 
a permanently changing economic and social business environment requires its evaluation at 
appropriate intervals” (FRC, 2010a, p. 1). These passages acknowledge, in a stronger tone 
than seen elsewhere in policy frameworks of corporate governance, the limitations of codes 
of conduct and of policy (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013).  
Moreover the new UK code signaled appreciation that cognition was not merely 
bounded by the processing powers of the directors. That the environment is “permanently 
changing” and the code “not immutable” suggests that practitioners recognize mutability and 
contingency as inherent. This in turn suggests that directors look not for rational solutions 
and ideal corporate governance, but rather for a temporally bounded, contingent view of 
what is reasonable under the circumstances, and accept their may be reasonable doubt, as 
well.  
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Philosophical stances  
The narrow rationality of the early corporate governance prescriptions is a positivist 
argument grounded ethically in utility. There is a right way forward to a goal of shareholder 
value, and it is one that could apply to all economic entities if only they weren’t subject to 
constraints on the mechanisms of free markets.2 As the discourse shifts from efficient 
markets to structure, the basis of the prescriptions becomes structural determinism, in which 
social structures, rather than individual agency, determine the path to utility. As the 
discourse shifts again from structure to independence, rationality yields to rationality-within-
limits, and the weight of governance falls on the individual director. The director embodies 
an idealist view of good governance and an ethical stance based in principles of duty, to 
shareholders and the welfare of the company.  
Less discussed and less well understood is notion of reasonableness and its implications 
for corporate governance policy and research. Following a brief recap on rational approaches 
and the origins of discomfort about their implications, we turn to discuss in greater depth the 
philosophical origins of this stance and then articulate a research agenda to develop its 
potential in interpreting corporate governance practice and in policy-making. 
Toward the reasonable 
The notion of market efficiency developed in the 1950s assumed rational investors 
would, through the wisdom of markets, find the right price for assets, provided all relevant 
information was freely and widely available (Fama, 1970). At the same time, however, 
doubts about rationality were emerging elsewhere in the literatures of economics and 
epistemology. Herbert Simon wrote of rationality as being bounded by our ability to 
compute the values at stake (Simon, 1955, 1959); his insights led to a new field of 
behavioral economics.  
Nordberg  ‘Reasonably’ good corporate governance 
Philosophy of Management conference, St. Louis  Page 18 
 
Philosophers have long drawn a distinction between the rational and the reasonable. 
Rawls (2005, p. 48n) traces it to Kant’s distinction between the categorical and hypothetical 
imperative in his Groundwork (1785/1964), the former being something that derives 
rationally at applies universally, while the latter reasoned but contingent on other 
circumstances. Linking the concept of the reasonable to his theory of justice as fairness 
(Rawls, 1958, 1999), he argues reasonableness involves a suspension of belief in 
comprehensive doctrines. Doing so makes possible the creation of liberal institutions, which 
accept freedom of action, rather than rule-based, structural solutions.  
However, Sen (2009) contends that Rawls’s political ideal, like his invocation of the 
“original position” in his theory of justice, nonetheless involves a transcendental stance, 
possible if not yet obtained. Sen questions whether it is possible “to identify ‘just’ 
institutions for a society without making them contingent upon actual behaviour” whether or 
not that behavior is just or reasonable (Sen, 2009, p. 68). That is, Rawls’s reasonableness, 
like Simon’s rationality, suggests striving toward an a priori truth. 
The period in which Simon drew attention to bounded rationality and Rawls first 
articulated reasonableness in the context of justice saw other doubts about rationality 
emerge, though without positing an ideal condition. The philosopher Stephen Toulmin 
published the book The Uses of Argument in 1958 (republished 2003). In it he drew the 
distinction between the formal argument familiar in the abstract world of mathematics and 
what he called the substantive argumentation that constitutes discussion in the practical 
world of ordinary life. 
Substantive argumentation involves a claim, supported by grounds, which are then 
linked by a warrant, the justification that leads us to accept the claim. This approach makes 
sense when the warrant itself is clear.3 Moreover, the more complex the field, the less likely 
that a claim and its associated warrant would be what Toulmin calls “field-invariant.” With 
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“field-dependent” ones, qualifications and counter-claims are possible, creating ambiguity in 
argumentation.  
The importance of field-dependent variables is not just that they limit the ability of 
people to determine what is rational. They make the argument contingent on circumstances, 
preventing actors from coming to a single rationality. This argument was controversial at the 
time, running counter to mainstream analytic philosophy. But it resonated with many other 
thinkers, contributing to the sense of an inherent non-rationality arising in physics since 
Einstein and Heisenberg and evident in the sociology that came to be called post-modernism.  
In Cosmopolis, Toulmin (1992) traced excessive faith in rationality in the modern era to 
Descartes and the resulting narrow conception of scientific inquiry that followed in the 
tradition he helped to establish.4 Returning to these themes in Return to Reason (2001), he 
argued that the best we could expect in an uncertain and contingent world was that people 
acted reasonably. It resonates with the contingency associated with the pragmatists Thomas 
Dewey and William James and is central to the work of Richard Rorty (1989). 
Reasonableness is an important concept in law and business. Juries are asked to find 
evidence of guilt “beyond reasonable doubt”. This view of reasonableness is often linked to 
the one Rawls articulated, namely that there is truth, but that it is difficult to identify with 
certainty. Directors, for example of corporations based in Delaware and other jurisdictions 
that have accepted its prevailing logic, might call it “business judgment”, the rule that 
prevents shareholders for using hindsight to sue board members when a decision goes wrong 
(cf. Pearlstein, 2014; Sharfman, 2014). Insofar as business judgment involves acceptance of 
uncertainty, it is more akin to Toulmin’s view than Rawls’s.  
Among management theorists, Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) invoke Toulmin’s doubts 
about the rational in arguing for what they term “practical” rather than “scientific” 
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rationality. Theirs is a view rooted in historically situated contingency and the rejection of 
the ideal, however remote.  
Rationality, associated philosophically with positivism and certainty, falters at the hurdle 
of describing what happens in practice. Since Toulmin’s early work, the analytic philosophy 
of the 1930s to 1950s has been in retreat and moral problems (he uses the example of 
medical practice) “are being handled less by strictly theoretical analysis than on a ‘case-by-
case’ basis” (Toulmin, 2001, p. 167). In the face of complexity, of the sort of complexity that 
defies calculation, multiple answers may apply to the same situation, and what’s best is 
impossible to determine.  
Toulmin suggests the appeal of the rational arose from its formal, mathematical proof, 
which became compelling because its abstraction conveyed universality. The power of the 
proof lies in its formality, that is, its separation from the messiness of the world. Coping with 
that world, however, requires something else, what he calls “substantive arguments,” which 
involve three distinctions from formal inquiries: first, that evidence from the real world is 
historical and therefore becomes dated; second, that rival interpretations of such data are 
possible; and third, that the concepts involved in interpretation can be ambiguous (Toulmin, 
2001, pp. 20-21).  
The most substantive arguments can claim “is to put a conclusion ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ and establish the ‘strongest possible presumption’” (Toulmin, 2001, p. 19). These 
expressions are familiar in criminal law as well as the philosophical discussion that followed 
his Uses of Argument in the 1950s. This is not a relativist approach to determining the right 
thing to do. It is, rather, an argument based on contingency: In these circumstances, at this 
time, it is what reasonable people can agree.  
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Contingency, reasonableness and trust  
During the four decades of debate over corporate governance, corporations and their 
executives and boards have been seen as seeking to maintain the discretion associated with a 
managerialist warrant (i.e. managers know best because of informational advantages). 
Competing claims came first from a warrant of shareholder primacy, with roots in market 
mechanisms. This approach sought to expand information and reduce asymmetries, and in 
extremis invoke the market for corporate control. When those claims falter after evidence of 
continued malpractice, a second attempt arises, based on structural reform and a warrant 
rooted in structuralism (i.e. structures determine behavior). When those claims falter, a 
professional warrant emerged based a belief that independent agents with certain 
characteristics will constrain others.  
Corporate governance actors thus make competing, substantive arguments over the value 
of one mechanism versus another based on differing claims, resting on different warrants but 
rooted in the same grounds: recurrent corporate failures. In Toulmin’s terms, the 
mechanisms of governance shaped in the codes, practice and policy involve field-dependent 
understandings and field-dependent warrants to the competing claims, sometimes articulated, 
sometimes not. 
Following Toulmin’s argument, rationality cannot deal with the uncertainties inherent in 
complex situations, those populated with field-dependent variables. In the case of corporate 
governance reform, when that third claim falters, a fourth warrant develops, based on 
reasonable people agreeing on how to respond to complex situations, in the knowledge that 
their judgment can at best be contingent. It makes the assumption that accountability of what 
Roberts (1991, 2001) calls the socializing variety will lead to understanding that accepts the 
contingency of decision, builds trust, and provides a route to think again.  
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Some ‘reasonable’ inferences for further research 
This analysis points to a number of reasonable inferences for policy and practice and a 
method to focus future research. If we accept that Toulmin’s view applies in corporate 
governance, then attempts to find correlations, even causality between variables of 
governance and performance are likely to be frustrated in the effort to guide corporate 
decision processes.  
Such relationships may, however, have predictive value at the level of the portfolio, and 
thus be of use to institutional investors, who monitor the performance of, say, 2,000 
companies to select a portfolio of, say, 500 investments. They are much less likely, however, 
to have predictive value at the level of individual boards and appointments of directors, 
where interpersonal relations and social complexity come into play. Worse, using such 
relationships as targets is likely to have perverse outcomes, through managing to targets 
rather than making reasonable arguments in reasoned debate (cf. O'Neill, 2002).  
Future research might, therefore, explore at a practice level how corporate decisions are 
made, especially in complex situations. It might examine in what way rational decision 
processes (e.g. calculations of net present value in an acquisition) are influenced by the 
uncertainties associated with considerations of other stakeholders, questions of the threat to 
corporate culture, or implications for the supply chain or value network of either the target 
firm or the acquirer. Theoretical research might consider how a real-options approach to 
strategic decisions deals with contingency and whether that could bring other lessons to 
seemingly simpler problems, such as identifying a new outside, non-executive director for 
the audit committee.  
Policy-focused research might consider how better to tie regulation of corporate 
governance into the less formal, voluntary processes associated with codes of practice. 
Natural experiments already exist, for example in the differences between German and UK 
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practice in the period since the German corporate governance code. The latter has a statutory 
framework but nonetheless mirrors provisions of the non-statutory, quasi-self-regulatory UK 
code. The German code includes the UK language in its comply-or-explain regime, which 
undercuts the power of statute. Might comply-or-explain itself be considered a reasonable 
compromise, giving boards discretion and portfolio managers a tool to manage risk?  
This paper has also identified how interpretations of “good” governance has come to 
develop layers of argument about how to organize the work of boards of directors and their 
interactions with shareholders and others in the search for accountability. These layers arise 
from conflicting philosophical underpinnings, however, which may result in redundant or 
conflicting prescriptions. If we accept that reasonableness is an appropriate starting point, 
then research might seek to identify what constellations of mechanisms, processes, and 
practices provide reasonable substitutes for each other, rather than become additions to an 
ever-expanding arsenal to protect corporate integrity.  
Some wider inferences are these: If we accept Toulmin’s view, then in a variety of 
policy domains, macro-level associations—while useful for seeing the big picture—may be 
less valuable in prescribing micro-level decisions. The rules of the game embodied in field-
level institutional arrangements may be handy short cuts in boundedly rational contexts, but 
they are less likely to provide guidance in complex or rapidly changing situations, where 
thoughtfulness is needed in application. And in a landscape of overlapping fields and 
competing institutions, openness to narrative and transparency during debate may be a better 
way to foster trust.  
Conclusions: toward reasonable accountability? 
The history of corporate governance policy outlined in this paper suggests that attempts 
to control through market mechanisms or board structures, rationally devised, may limit the 
freedom of action of those responsible for corporate excess without prevent excess itself. 
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Boundedly rational appeals to independently minded directors may constrain access to 
industry- and company-specific knowledge, when definitions of independence exclude those 
in a position to understand strategic issues. Such mechanisms may also threaten the 
discretion needed for experimentation, innovation and coping with the complexities that 
uncertainty entails.  
In exercising reasonable oversight of the business, a board should be able to explain 
where, when and why discretion is needed, and in what ways the standard formula doesn’t 
fit. That is, directors should be able to provide a narrative of what matters and why. In 
explaining his discomfort with the modernist project of Descartes and later philosophers, 
Toulmin (2001, p. 15) writes that the “reasonableness of narratives” came to be dismissed as 
a “soft-centered notion”. Reasonableness is a middle way between the dichotomy of 
relativism and rationality.  
Read normatively, Toulmin’s reasonableness urges accountability, but not the 
accountability of perfect scores on a questionnaire. Instead it urges what Toulmin calls 
“substantive argumentation” in both corporate decision-making and public policy 
frameworks. Read from a practice perspective, reasonably good corporate governance 
involves the ability to look one’s fellow directors in the eye and explain, or demand an 
explanation of, why this course of action is, somehow, best: best, that is, not of necessity, as 
in a mathematical proof, but, in Toulmin’s terms, through substantive argumentation.  
Reasonably good corporate governance would involve doing that in public as well, to 
shareholders and others, but also without pretending to have the formal proofs. This suggests 
that reasonable accountability is the ability to give a reasonable account, after thoughtful 
consideration and substantive argumentation, of one’s decisions about an uncertain world.  
                                                 
1
 The use of “mentalities of governance” here is a deliberate echo of “governmentality” in 
Foucault (2009), who explored the shift in understanding the nature of government as the 
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Renaissance order gave way to acceptance of a rational, modernist rule of law in the 
Enlightenment, with the disruption of the Thirty-Years’ War as a catalyst.  
2
 We see evidence of this in the rise of corporate governance ratings agencies being used not 
used as voting services for asset managers, but also in those investors’ portfolio selection.  
3
 An example may help clarify Toulmin’s three aspects of argument: Ground: X was born in 
New York; Claim: X is a US citizen; Warrant: The US grants citizenship to all people born 
on US soil. Here, the warrant can arguably be accepted at face value; its logic does not vary 
by specific circumstances. Such warrants are sometimes left unspoken, understood by those 
concerned. But it does not consider the possibility that X has renounced US citizenship, 
illustrating the contingency. And warrants are also historically situated and may need to be 
qualified: Before a certain date, people born on US soil might lose US nationality, for 
example by taking the nationality of their non-US parents. 
4
 Toulmin traces the problems of rationalism to Descartes, whose experiences during the 
Thirty-Years’ War ironically may have provided strong emotional motivations to seek 
explanations that exclude emotion.  
 Table 1 – Periods and discourses of corporate governance 
Period of 
events 
1973-76 1991-92 2001-03 2007-10 
Field-
configuring 
events 
Rise of mutual 
funds; stagflation; 
corporate 
underperformance 
esp. US 
Corporate 
failures, esp. 
UK: Maxwell, 
BCCI, Colorall, 
Polly Peck 
Corporate 
failures, 
worldwide: e.g. 
Enron, 
WorldCom, 
Tyco; Parmalat; 
HIH; dot-com 
bubble 
Global financial 
crisis: Lehman, 
Merrill Lynch, 
AIG; RBS, 
HBOS, 
Northern Rock; 
Fortis 
Discourse Market 
mechanisms of 
corporate and 
managerial 
control 
Board structure Board 
independence 
and 
professionalism 
Board, investor 
relationships 
Key documents Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); 
Rappaport (1981) 
Cadbury (1992) Library of 
Congress 
(2002); 
Breeden (2003); 
Higgs (2003) 
FRC (2010b); 
European 
Commission 
(2014) 
 
 
Table 2 – Discourses and accountability, cognition, and stance 
Discourse 
Market 
mechanisms 
Board structure 
Board 
independence 
Board, investor 
relationships 
Accountability Vertical-
hierarchical; 
shareholder 
value via 
markets and 
external 
monitoring 
Vertical-
hierarchical; 
shareholder 
value via 
internal 
monitoring 
Horizontal or 
quasi-
horizontal; 
shareholder 
value via 
internal control 
Relational 
governance, 
horizontal and 
vertical 
Cognition Rational actors 
in efficient 
markets 
Rational actors 
in inefficient 
markets  
Bounded 
rationality 
Reasonableness 
Ontological and 
ethical stance 
Positivism; 
utility 
Structuralism; 
utility 
Idealism; duty Pragmatism 
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